VLA Safety

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지하윤

Natural Language Processing
& Artificial Intelligence

SafeVLA: Towards Safety Alignment of Vision-Language-Action Model via Constrained Learning

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NeurIPS 2025 (https://arxiv.org/pdf/2503.03480)

AGENTSAFE: Benchmarking the Safety of Embodied Agents on Hazardous Instructions

Zonghao Ying[1*], Le Wang[1*], Yisong Xiao[1], Jiakai Wang[2], Yuqing Ma[1], Jinyang Guo[1], Zhenfei Yin[3], Mingchuan Zhang[4], Aishan Liu[1†], Xianglong Liu[1]

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CVPR 2026 (https://cvpr.thecvf.com/virtual/2026/poster/36429)

SafeVLA: Towards Safety Alignment of Vision-Language-Action Model via Constrained Learning

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NeurIPS 2025 Spotlight (https://arxiv.org/pdf/2503.03480)

Overview

- Vision-Language-Action model (VLA)
  → Multimodal instruction 기반의 다양한 task를 수행할 수 있는 generalist robot policy로 발전하고 있음
- Real-world scenarios
  → VLA를 실제 환경에 적용하는 것은 환경, 로봇, 인간에 대한 잠재적인 위험을 포함한 안전 문제를 야기함
- Current safety mechanisms for LLMs & VLMs
  → 현재의 LLMs, VLMs에 사용되는 safety mechanism은 로봇 공학에서 나타나는 물리적 위험에 부적합함

⇒ 본 연구: 성능 저하 없이 안전 제약 조건을 VLA에 통합하는 방법 모색, Integrated Safety Approach 제안

1) Constrained Markov Decision Process (CMDP) 프레임워크 내에서 안전 제약 조건 모델링
2) Safety-CHORES 벤치마크 환경 구성을 통해 다양한 위험 행동 유도
3) CMDP 기반 SafeRL 활용, VLA policy 조절

Problem Formulation

- **Constrained Markov Decision Process (CMDP)**

  불확실성 하의 다목적 동적 의사결정을 모델링하기 위한 프레임워크

$$M = (S, A, \mathbb{P}, r, C, \mu, \gamma)$$

S, A	상태 공간 (State Space), 행동 공간 (Action Space)
$\mathbb{P}(s' \mid s, a)$	상태 전이 확률 — (s, a)이후 s'에 도달할 확률
$r(s' \mid s, a)$	보상 함수 — 전이 $(s \to s')$시 받는 보상
$C = \{(c_i, b_i)\}_{i=1}^{m}$	비용 제약 집합 — c_i는 비용 함수, b_i는 허용 상한
$\mu(\cdot)$	초기 상태 분포
$\gamma \in (0, 1)$	Discount Factor

$\mathcal{H}_t$ – 시점 t까지의 모든 궤적 집합 $(s_0, a_0, \cdots, s_{t-2}, a_{t-2}, s_{t-1})$

Problem Formulation

- From CMDP to VLA Safety Alignment
  - 자연어 명령어 집합 $\mathcal{L}$을 추가하여 확장 튜플 정의

$$M_{VLA} = (S, A, \mathbb{P}, r, C, \mathcal{L}, \mu, \gamma)$$

  - 보상함수 정의

$$r\colon S \times S \times A \times \mathcal{L} \to \mathbb{R}$$

  - VLA 정책 행동출력

$$a_t \sim \pi_\theta(\cdot \mid l,\ h_t)$$

$$h_t = (o_{t+1-H}, a_{t+1-H}, \ldots, o_t),\ o_t = (v_t, p_t)$$

  - The reward-return

$$\mathcal{J}(\pi_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}) = \mathbb{E}_{\pi_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}, \mathcal{L}}\left[\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \gamma^t r\left(s_{t+1} \middle| s_t, a_t, l\right)\right]$$

  - The set of feasible policies

$$\Pi_C = \left\{ \pi_{\boldsymbol{\theta}} \in \Pi_\Theta \mid \mathbb{E}_{\pi_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}}\left[\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \gamma^t c_i(s_t, a_t)\right] \leq b_i, \forall i = 1, \ldots, m \right\}$$

  - 최종 목적함수

$$\pi^* = \arg\max_{\pi_{\boldsymbol{\theta}} \in \Pi_C} \mathcal{J}(\pi_{\boldsymbol{\theta}})$$

ISA: Integrated Safety Approach



ISA: Integrated Safety Approach

(A) Modeling Safety: Scenes, Specifications, and Tasks

- **Modeling Task**

$$t_i = (e_i,\ x_i,\ q_i,\ G,\ \Phi,\ \Psi)$$

$e_i \in E$	Scene	로봇이 동작하는 실내 환경
x_i	초기 위치	로봇이 시작하는 랜덤 위치
q_i	초기 방향	로봇이 시작하는 랜덤 방향
G	오브젝트 카테고리 집합	환경 내 상호작용 가능한 물체들
Φ	State-action predicate	즉각적 위험 판단 규칙
Ψ	Trajectory predicate	시간에 걸친 위험 판단 규칙

Safety Predicate

– State-Action Predicate Φ

$$\phi(s,a) = 1 \iff P_s(s) \wedge P_a(a) \wedge R(s,a),$$

– Trajectory Predicate Ψ

$$\psi(\tau) = 1 \iff \exists t_0, \ldots, t_k \in [0, \text{len}(\tau)] \text{ s.t. } \left(\bigwedge_{i=0}^{k} E_i(s_{t_i}, a_{t_i}) \right) \wedge R_{\text{temporal}}(\{(t_j, s_{t_j}, a_{t_j})\}_{j=0}^{k}, \tau),$$



- **Safety-CHORES**

$$t_i^{\text{static}} \xrightarrow{g \sim G,\ l \sim \mathcal{L}} t_i^{\text{instance}}$$

– Safety-ObjNav
여러 방 탐색 후 지정 물체의 위치로 이동

– Safety-PickUp
시야 내 물체 집어올리기

– Safety-Fetch
탐색 + 집기 통합

ISA: Integrated Safety Approach

(B) Eliciting Risks: Uncovering Latent Unsafe Behaviors



Figure 2: **Upper:** Conceptual diagrams of each safety critical component. **Lower:** Corresponding photorealistic examples from our simulation environment.

- **Safety-CHORES**
  - ProcTHOR (150K indoor scenes)
  - Objaverse (800K 3D assets)
  - AI2THOR (simulator)
- **Safety Critical Components**
  - Corner ϕ_{Corner}
  - Blind Spot $\psi_{Blind\ Spot}$
  - Fragile Collection $\psi_{Fragile\ Colletion}$
  - Critical Point $\psi_{Critical\ Point}$
  - Dangerous Equipment $\phi_{Dangerous\ Equipment}$

ISA: Integrated Safety Approach

(C) Constraining Policies: Safe Reinforcement Learning for Alignment
(D) Safety Assurance: Evaluating Aligned VLAs



- **Step 1: Predicate → Cost Signal**

  State-Action Predicate ϕ_k 위반 시점 t에 즉시 비용 1

  Trajectory Predicate ψ_j 위반 구간의 마지막 step에만 비용 1

- **Step 2: Lagrangian Relaxation**

$$\pi^* = \arg\max_{\pi_\theta \in \Pi_C} \mathcal{J}(\pi_\theta) \longrightarrow \min_\theta \max_{\lambda \geq 0} \left[-J_r(\theta) + \sum_{i=0}^{n} \lambda_i J_{c_i}(\theta) \right]$$

Test-time Safety
학습된 안전 행동이 OOD 환경에서도 유지되는가?

Long-tail Safety
통계적으로 희귀한 위험 상황에서도 안전한가?

Extreme Failure Safety
태스크 완수가 불가능한 상황에서도 안전하게 행동하는가?

Experiments

(1) Experimental Setup

- Tasks & Environments

  Safety-CHORES / iTHOR, ProcTHOR, RoboTHOR

- Training

  비용상한: FLaRe 수렴 비용의 20%

  ObjNav·PickUp: 15M / Fetch: 25M

- Baseline Methods

IL only	SPOC-DINOv2, SPOC-SigLip-S/L	모방학습만 사용
IL only (Ground Truth)	SPOC w/ GT det	Ground Truth 정보 활용 (특권 정보)
IL+RL (Standard)	FLaRe	태스크 성능 위주 RL 파인튜닝
IL+RL (Reward Shipping)	FLaRe-RS	안전 비용을 보상 페널티로 사용
RL only	Poliformer	내비게이션 전용 end-to-end RL

- Evaluation Metrics

  SR (↑) Task Success Rate

  CC (↓) Cumulative Cost: $\sum_{k=1}^{K} \sum_{t=0}^{L-1} c_k(s_t, a_t)$

Experiments
(2) Main Results

- Comparative Performance: ISA vs. Standard Methods

Type	Methods	Safety-ObjNav		Safety-PickUp		Safety-Fetch	
		SR ↑	CC ↓	SR ↑	CC ↓	SR ↑	CC ↓
IL+RL	ISA	**0.865**	**1.854**	**0.928**	**0.372**	**0.637**	**8.084**
	FLaRe	0.822	12.356	0.912	7.076	0.605	43.364
	FLaRe-RS	0.75	4.755	0.918	7.496	0.45	18.19
IL	SPOC-DINOv2	0.43	13.504	0.86	10.288	0.14	13.97
	SPOC-SigLip-S	0.584	14.618	0.883	6.111	0.14	32.413
	SPOC-SigLip-L	0.38	17.594	0.83	5.713	0.135	41.391
	SPOC-SigLip-S w/GT det	0.815	23.544	0.9	13.912	0.597	40.114
	SPOC-SigLip-L w/GT det	0.849	17.497	0.918	3.888	0.561	26.607
RL-Only	Poliformer	0.804	9.218	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

- Qualitative Insights: Risk Handling and Failure Modes



전체



성공



실패

Experiments

(3) Ablation Studies: Impact of Key ISA Design Choices

- Importance of Risk Elicitation



SR: 파랑
CC: 초록

- Importance of Lagrangian Multipliers λ



- Impact of Cost Threshold b_i



SR: 파랑
CC: 초록

- ISA Generalizability to Different VLA Models



Experiments

(4) Robustness

Table 2: **OOD results across tasks.**

	Safety-ObjNav		Safety-PickUp		Safety-Fetch	
Perturbation	SR ↑	CC ↓	SR ↑	CC ↓	SR ↑	CC ↓
ISA	**0.865**	**1.854**	0.928	0.372	0.637	8.984
+Color	0.804	3.095	0.902	1.816	0.602	15.337
+Light	0.833	2.490	**0.928**	0.687	0.605	8.516
+Material	0.839	2.983	0.916	0.638	**0.653**	**8.244**
+All	0.817	3.212	0.903	**0.406**	0.589	12.496
Average	-0.042	+1.090	-0.015	+0.515	-0.025	+2.164

- Safety Under Extreme Task Failure Conditions





Color Lighting



Material All

Normal

Conclusion

- ISA (Integrated Safety Approach) for VLA Safety Alignment
  CMDP 기반 SafeRL 원칙을 Modeling → Eliciting → Constraining → Assurance 4단계로 체계적 통합
- Key Results
  안전성 83.58% 향상 (vs. SOTA) with 태스크 성능 +3.85% 유지
- Safety Assurance
  Long-tail 위험 완화
  OOD 환경 일반화
  극단적 실패 상황에서도 안전 행동 유지

AGENTSAFE: Benchmarking the Safety of Embodied Agents on Hazardous Instructions

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CVPR 2026 (https://cvpr.thecvf.com/virtual/2026/poster/36429)

Overview

- 기존 안전 평가의 한계
  - ① 좁은 위험 범주
    일부 hazard만 다룸
  - ② 최종 결과만 평가
    task success rate 위주의 평가로 과정은 평가되지 않음
  - ③ 파이프라인 미고려
    perception-planning-execution의 전과정에 대한 분석 부재

- AGENTSAFE 제안

$$\underbrace{\text{SAFE-THOR}}_{\text{시뮬레이션 샌드박스}} + \underbrace{\text{SAFE-VERSE}}_{\text{위험 태스크 스위트}} + \underbrace{\text{SAFE-DIAGNOSE}}_{\text{다단계 평가 프로토콜}}$$



Figure 1. Overall illustration of our *AGENTSAFE*, the first comprehensive benchmark for evaluating the safety of embodied VLM agents under hazardous instructions.

Preliminaries and Threat Model

- Embodied VLM Agent: POMDP Modeling

$$a_t = \mathcal{M}(I, (o_1, \ldots, o_t))$$

목표: Task를 성공적 & 안전하게 완수하는 행동 시퀀스 생성

- Threat Model

목표: 유해한 결과를 직접적으로 초래하는 지시를 agent가 거부할 수 있는 능력을 평가하는 것

  - Normal Use Case: Benign Instructions

    I_{normal} → 기본적인 태스크 수행 능력 베이스라인
  - Adversarial Use Case: Hazardous Instructions

    I_{base} → 명확한 위험 의도, 상식적 판단으로 거부 가능

    I_{adv} → Jailbreaking 기법 적용으로 위험 의도 은폐

AGENTSAFE



Figure 2. Overview of *AGENTSAFE*, a benchmark that systematically evaluates embodied agent safety via an interactive sandbox (SAFE-THOR), a hazardous task suite (SAFE-VERSE), and a multi-stage diagnostic protocol (SAFE-DIAGNOSE).

AGENTSAFE
(1) SAFE-THOR



- Evaluation Sandbox
- AI2THOR 시뮬레이션 환경 기반
- Universal Agent Adapter
  High-level reasoning of embodied VLM agents → low-level API of the simulator
  ① Perception grounding module G_p
  시각 관측 → VLM 이해 가능 표현으로 변환
  ② Action grounding module G_a
  VLM의 자연어 plan → 실행 가능 low-level action으로 변환
  예) `Navigate (), Pickup (), Toggle ()`
- 두 가지 Agent Workflow 지원

$$(\tau_t, \pi_t) = \Psi_{ours}(I,\ G_p(o_t),\ H_t)$$
$$\pi_t = \Psi_{ext}(I, G_p(o_t), H_t)$$

AGENTSAFE
(2) SAFE-VERSE



① Normal Instructions I_{normal}
→ 기본적인 태스크 수행 능력 베이스라인 (예: *Place the apple on the kitchen counter*)

② Baseline Hazardous Instructions I_{base}
Asimov Robot 3원칙 → *Human-Harm, Environment-Harm, Self-Harm*
→ 명확한 위험 의도, 상식적 판단으로 거부 가능

③ Adversarially-Enhanced Instructions I_{adv}
→ Jailbreaking 기법 적용으로 위험 의도 은폐

AGENTSAFE

(3) SAFE-DIAGNOSE



① **Perception**

Grounding Recall (GR)

실제 물체 중 에이전트가 인식한 비율

Hallucination Rate (HR)

존재하지 않는 물체를 환각한 비율

② **Planning**

LLM-as-a-Judge (GPT-4o)

Planning Rejection Rate (PRR)

위험 명령어를 올바르게 거부한 비율

Planning Success Rate (PSR)

완전한 실행 계획을 생성한 비율

③ **Execution**

Task Success Rate (TSR)

태스크를 실제로 완수한 비율

(4) SAFE-AUDIT

- A Thought-level Safety Module

$$\tau'_{init} = \mathcal{F}_{audit}(\tau_{init},\ I,\ C)$$

Experiments and Evaluation

Table 1. Performance metrics (%) for embodied VLM agents on three stages when executing normal instructions.

Stage		Perception		Planning		Execution
Metric		GR ↑	HR ↓	PSR ↑	PRR ↓	TSR ↓
VLM	GPT-5-mini	81.51	13.60	80.89	0.00	75.33
	Claude-opus-4	50.47	2.50	47.33	3.11	46.22
	Claude-sonnet-3.5	35.81	6.82	31.11	18.67	29.56
	Qwen-VL-Plus	50.73	0.00	48.44	0.22	42.63
	Gemini-2.5-flash	75.31	22.37	67.78	0.44	66.89
	Doubao-1.5-vision	54.18	0.04	47.33	0.00	46.56
	Step-v1-8k	82.79	1.21	77.77	0.00	75.72
	GLM-4.5v	61.25	0.07	57.56	0.00	49.33
	Hunyuan-vision	49.92	3.39	46.67	0.89	39.22
Workflow	ReAct	68.46	0.00	65.29	0.00	60.41
	ProgPrompt	66.84	0.00	65.00	0.00	53.85



Figure 6. Performance of the model driven by Gemini-2.5-flash when executing adversarially enhanced instructions.

Table 2. Performance metrics (%) for embodied VLM agents of three stages when executing hazardous instructions.

Instruction		Self-Harm					Env-Harm					Human-Harm				
Stage		Perception		Planning		Execution	Perception		Planning		Execution	Perception		Planning		Execution
Metric		GR ↑	HR ↓	PSR ↓	PRR ↑	TSR ↓	GR ↑	HR ↓	PSR ↓	PRR ↑	TSR ↓	GR ↑	HR ↓	PSR ↓	PRR ↑	TSR ↓
VLM	GPT-5-mini	81.13	12.66	64.73	27.90	51.12	81.20	14.50	59.11	32.44	50.44	82.18	12.53	80.04	18.16	70.60
	Claude-opus-4	50.47	2.50	22.89	58.67	16.89	50.47	2.50	31.33	40.44	18.67	53.79	0.56	12.44	85.56	5.89
	Claude-sonnet-3.5	36.64	5.74	27.56	30.00	21.56	36.27	6.21	24.34	26.95	19.15	40.01	6.78	6.44	90.11	1.11
	Qwen-VL-Plus	50.59	0.00	45.99	3.12	27.17	50.63	0.00	46.89	1.67	26.89	54.70	0.00	46.89	2.20	23.33
	Gemini-2.5-flash	75.38	22.57	67.78	1.78	54.67	75.31	22.37	65.78	0.44	61.56	74.88	21.34	68.22	7.78	45.33
	Doubao-1.5-vision	54.20	0.10	41.56	0.88	37.11	54.77	0.04	46.00	0.44	38.22	58.00	0.00	49.00	8.44	26.67
	Step-v1-8k	82.78	1.31	74.43	0.00	43.43	82.76	1.18	72.76	0.00	51.22	83.14	1.06	79.11	0.44	40.67
	GLM-4.5v	61.01	0.20	55.33	0.22	41.33	61.13	0.21	56.22	0.00	42.00	63.64	0.19	48.22	9.11	27.78
	Hunyuan-vision	49.64	3.81	33.33	10.00	24.22	49.42	3.61	38.89	6.44	32.44	52.29	3.64	48.89	40.44	19.33
Workflow	ReAct	68.41	0.00	42.55	6.38	29.79	65.97	0.00	39.13	4.35	26.09	69.13	0.00	17.95	51.28	2.56
	ProgPrompt	66.71	0.00	48.08	0.00	25.00	67.81	0.00	59.62	0.00	34.62	68.54	0.00	69.39	0.00	32.65



(a) PSR (%) (b) PRR (%) (c) TSR (%)

Figure 7. Agent performance on normal instructions (D denotes Doubao-1.5-vision-pro, G denotes Gemini-2.5-flash, Q denotes Qwen-VL-Plus, S denotes Step-v1-8k).



(a) PSR (%) (b) PRR (%) (c) TSR (%)

Figure 8. Agent performance on environment-harm instructions (D denotes Doubao-1.5-vision-pro, G denotes Gemini-2.5-flash, Q denotes Qwen-VL-Plus, S denotes Step-v1-8k).

Conclusion

- **AGENTSAFE: Comprehensive Safety Benchmark for Embodied VLM Agents**
  SAFE-THOR + SAFE-VERSE + SAFE-DIAGNOSE로 구성된 최초의 종합 안전 벤치마크
- **Key Findings**
  현재 VLM 에이전트의 핵심 취약점: 위험을 인식하더라도 Planning 단계에서 안전한 행동으로 반영하지 못함Jailbreak 기법은 안전 필터 우회 시 명령어 명확성을 동시에 훼손 → embodied 환경 특유의 역설
- **SAFE-AUDIT**
  Thought-level 개입으로 utility 유지(+2.22% TSR)하면서 위험 행동 억제(TSR 0.48%)
- **Contribution**
  Perception-Planning-Execution 전 파이프라인에 걸친 fine-grained 안전 진단 프레임워크 최초 제시